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DataLair: Efficient Block Storage with Plausible Deniability against Multi-Snapshot Adversaries

Abstract: Sensitive information is present on our phones, disks, watches and computers. Its protection is essential. Plausible deniability of stored data allows individuals to deny that their device contains a piece of sensitive information. This constitutes a key tool in the fight against oppressive governments and censorship. Unfortunately, existing solutions, such as the now defunct TrueCrypt [5], can defend only against an adversary that can access a user’s device at most once (“single-snapshot adversary”). Recent solutions have traded significant performance overheads for the ability to handle more powerful adversaries able to access the device at multiple points in time (“multi-snapshot adversary”). In this paper we show that this sacrifice is not necessary. We introduce and build DataLair¹, a practical plausible deniability mechanism. When compared with existing approaches, DataLair is two orders of magnitude faster for public data accesses, and 5 times faster for hidden data accesses. An important component in DataLair is a new write-only ORAM construction which improves on the complexity of the state of the art write-only ORAM by a factor of $O(\log N)$, where N denotes the underlying storage disk size.

Keywords: Plausible deniability, oblivious access

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1 Introduction

With increasing amounts of sensitive data being stored on portable storage devices, disk encryption has become a necessity. Although full disk encryption (FDE) tools (such as dm-crypt) provide protection against unautho-

riized adversaries attempting to access sensitive data at rest, it does not allow the owner to deny possession of sensitive data. This is a serious challenge in the presence of oppressive regimes and other powerful adversaries that may want to coerce the user into revealing encryption keys. Unfortunately, this is an all-too-common occurrence as illustrated by numerous examples [24, 25], where sensitive data in possession of human rights activists have been subject to government scrutiny in oppressive regimes, thus endangering the witnesses.

Plausible deniability (PD) provides a strong defense against such coercion. A system with PD allows its users to deny the existence of stored sensitive information or the occurrence of a sensitive transaction[15].

An example of a plausibly deniable storage solution is the successful, yet unfortunately now-defunct TrueCrypt [5]. TrueCrypt divides a disk into multiple “password-protected” volumes and allows some of these volumes to be “hidden” in order to store sensitive data. Password-derived encryption keys are used to encrypt each such volume. Upon coercion, a user can plausibly deny the existence of a hidden volume by simply providing a valid password for one of the non-hidden ones, thus showing a plausible use for the disk without revealing the hidden volume data. TrueCrypt stores hidden volumes in the free space of non-hidden (public) volumes. To mask their existence, TrueCrypt fills all free space with random data and encrypts the hidden data with a randomized semantically secure encryption scheme with output indistinguishable from random.

However, as pointed out by Czeskis [9], TrueCrypt is not secure against an adversary that can access the disk at multiple points in time (e.g., multiple security checks or border crossings). In such scenarios, an adversary can save a disk snapshot and compare subsequent snapshots with it. Changes to free space occurring between snapshots will suggest the existence of hidden data.

A major reason why TrueCrypt fails to provide PD against an adversary with multiple snapshots is because it does not attempt to hide *access patterns*. The adversary can point out exact locations on disk that have changed in between snapshots and notice that the apparently free portion of the disk (potentially containing hidden data) appears altered.

¹ A preliminary version of this paper was present as a poster [26] with an overview of the technical solution described here.

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To defeat a multi-snapshot adversary, we need to eliminate all evidence of hidden data and its corresponding accesses – for example by ensuring that all modifications on the disk are attributable and indistinguishable from the traces of public data operations.

This means that modifications to apparently free space should be part of normal behavior of plausible public operations and the traces of hidden data accesses should be indistinguishable from the traces of public data accesses.

One effective way to achieve this is to “cloak” hidden accesses within public data accesses by always performing a public operation for every hidden operation. Further, oblivious access mechanisms (ORAM) can be used for randomizing accesses and making them indistinguishable [7]. Unfortunately, ORAMs come with very high overheads and reduce overall throughput by orders of magnitude.

Fortunately, a new insight emerges that enables a significant throughput increase: accesses to public data do not need to be hidden since the existence of public data is admitted. In fact, revealing access patterns to public data reinforces deniability as it shows non-hidden disk use to a curious adversary.

Consequently, DataLair uses this insight to design a significantly more efficient way to achieve strong PD: protecting only operations on the hidden data, while ensuring that they are indistinguishable from operations on public data (thus allowing the user to claim that all I/O to the disk is due to public accesses). Further, DataLair also optimizes the oblivious access mechanism deployed for hidden data.

In summary, public data is accessed (almost) directly without the need to use an oblivious access mechanism while hidden data accesses are mitigated through a new throughput-optimized write-only ORAM which significantly reduces access complexity when compared to existing work [7, 12]. As a result, DataLair is two orders of magnitude faster for public data accesses, and 5 times faster for hidden data accesses, when compared to existing work.

2 Related Work

Plausible deniability (PD) was first proposed in relation to deniable encryption [8]. Deniable encryption uses cryptographic techniques to allow decrypting the same ciphertext to different plaintexts.

Filesystem Level PD. For storage devices, Anderson et al. first explored the idea of steganographic filesystems and proposed two solutions for hiding data in [6]. The first solution is to use a set of cover files and their linear combinations to reconstruct hidden files. The ability to correctly compute the linear combination required to reconstruct a file was based on the knowledge of a user-defined password. The second solution was to use a hash based scheme for storing files at locations determined by the hash of the filename. This requires storing multiple copies of the same file at different locations to prevent data loss. Macdonald and Kahn [14] designed and implemented an optimized steganographic filesystem for Linux, that is derived from the second solution proposed in [6]. Pang et al. [17] further improved on the previous constructions by avoiding hash collisions and more efficient storage.

The solutions based on steganographic filesystem only defend against a single-snapshot adversary. Han et al. [11] designed a steganographic filesystem that allows multiple users to share the same hidden file. Further, runtime relocation of data ensures deniability against an adversary with multiple snapshots. However, the solution does not scale well to practical scenarios as deniability is attributed to joint-ownership of sensitive data. Defy [18] is a log structured file system for flash devices that offers PD using secure deletion. Although, Defy protects against a multi-snapshot adversary, it does so by storing all filesystem related metadata in the memory, which does not scale well for memory constrained systems with large external storage devices.

Block device level PD. At device-level, disk encryption tools such as Truecrypt [5] and Rubberhose [4] provide deniability but cannot protect against a multi-snapshot adversary. Mobiflage [20] also provides PD for mobile devices against a single-snapshot adversary. Blass et al. [7] were the first to deal with deniability against a multi-snapshot adversary at device level. The solution in [7] deploys a write-only ORAM for mapping data from logical volumes to an underlying storage device and hiding access patterns for hidden data within reads to non-hidden (public) data.

3 Model

We focus on storage-centric plausible deniability (PD) as in the results discussed above, but we note that PD has also been defined in more general frameworks [3].

Plausible Deniability in real life. It is important to understand however that the mere use of a system with PD capability may raise suspicion! This is particularly the case if PD-enabled systems have high overheads or are outright impractical when accessed for public data storage. This is why it is important to design mechanisms that are practical and do not impede the use of the device, especially for storing non-sensitive data. We envision a future where all block device logic is endowed with a PD mode of operation.

3.1 Preliminaries

Adversary. We consider a computationally bounded “multi-snapshot” adversary that has the power to coerce the user into providing a password. As in existing research [7], we also assume that the device user is not directly observed by the adversary during writes – a small amount of volatile memory is being used during reads and writes and is inaccessible to the adversary that can only see static device snapshots.

Configuration. While we note that there may be a number of other ways to achieve PD, our focus is on a practical solution involving storage devices with multiple logical volumes, independently encrypted with user password-derived keys.

To protect her sensitive data from adversaries, a user may write it encrypted to one of these logical volumes (the “hidden” volume). For PD, the user may choose to also write non-sensitive data to a “public” volume, encrypted with a key which can be provided to an adversary as proof of plausible device use.

Logical and physical blocks. For a block device hosting multiple logical (hidden or public) volumes, clients address data within each volume using logical block addresses. The data is stored on the underlying device using physical block addresses.

Access patterns. We define an *access pattern* informally as an *ordered sequence of logical block reads and writes*.

Write traces. We define a *write trace* as the actual modifications to physical blocks due to the execution of a corresponding *access pattern*.

Solution Space. While there might be multiple ways to achieve PD in a multi-volume multi-snapshot adversary setting, one idea [7] is to “hide” operations to the hidden volume “within” operations to the public volume. This prevents the adversary from gathering any information regarding user *access patterns* to the hidden

volume (hidden data access) by ensuring that the user can plausibly attribute any and all *writes traces* as accesses to the public volume (public data access) instead. On coercion, the user can provide the credentials for the public volume and thus plausibly deny the existence of the hidden data. Arguably, otherwise, in the absence of public volume operations, an adversary could question the reason for any observed changes to the space allocated for the hidden volume and then rightfully suspect the existence of a hidden volume.

Atomicity. As in existing work, a very small number of physical block I/O ops (corresponding to one DataLair read/write operation) are assumed to be performed as atomic transactions. The adversary may gain access only after entire transactions have completed (or rolled back). This is reasonable since the user is unlikely to perform any sensitive operation in the presence of an adversary.

Access pattern indistinguishability. Computational indistinguishability of traces has been widely discussed in ORAM literature [13, 21]. Further, most ORAMs employ randomization techniques which ensure that the *write traces* generated due to accesses are indistinguishable from random. As will be detailed later, indistinguishability of access patterns is one of the main requirements to achieve PD.

We also define the link between access patterns and write traces.

Definition 1. *Given two access patterns $\mathcal{O}_0 = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_i\}$ and $\mathcal{O}_1 = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_i\}$ and their corresponding write traces $\mathcal{W}_0 = \{w_1, w_2, \dots, w_i\}$ and $\mathcal{W}_1 = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i\}$, \mathcal{O}_0 is called *indistinguishable from \mathcal{O}_1* iff. \mathcal{W}_0 is computationally indistinguishable from \mathcal{W}_1 .*

3.2 Defining Plausible Deniability (PD-CPA)

We model PD as a “chosen pattern” security game, PD-CPA² for the block device. Since we focus on mechanisms that “hide” operations to the hidden volume “within” operations to the public volume, we also define an implementation-specific parameter establishing the number of operations that can be hidden within a public operation. Specifically, ϕ is the ratio of the num-

² The similarity with IND-CPA is intentional. The access patterns correspond to the “plaintexts” in an access pattern privacy setting.

ber of hidden operations that can be performed with a public operation such that the *write traces* due to the public operation with a hidden operation is indistinguishable from the *write traces* for the same operation without the hidden operations. This paper proposes a solution with $\phi = 1$ to ensure that each public operation performs *one* hidden operation.

We define PD-CPA(λ, ϕ), with security parameter λ between a challenger and an adversary as follows:

1. Adversary \mathcal{A} provides a storage device \mathcal{D} (*the adversary can decide its state fully*) to challenger \mathcal{C} .
2. \mathcal{C} chooses two encryption keys K_{pub} and K_{hid} using security parameter λ and creates two logical volumes, V_{pub} and V_{hid} , both stored in \mathcal{D} . Writes to V_{pub} and V_{hid} are encrypted with keys K_{pub} and K_{hid} respectively. \mathcal{C} also fairly selects a random bit b .
3. \mathcal{C} returns K_{pub} to \mathcal{A} .
4. The adversary \mathcal{A} and the challenger \mathcal{C} then engage in a polynomial number of rounds in which:
 - (a) \mathcal{A} selects two access patterns \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 with the following restriction:
 - \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_0 include the same writes to V_{pub}
 - Both \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_0 may include writes to V_{hid}
 - \mathcal{O}_0 or \mathcal{O}_1 should not include more writes to V_{hid} than ϕ times the number of operations to V_{pub} in that sequence.
 - (b) \mathcal{C} executes \mathcal{O}_b on \mathcal{D} and sends a snapshot of the device to \mathcal{A} .
 - (c) \mathcal{A} outputs b' .
 - (d) \mathcal{A} is said to have “won” the round iff. $b' = b$.

We note that the restrictions imposed on the adversary-generated access patterns are necessary to eliminate trivially-identifiable cases. E.g., allowing different writes to V_{pub} in \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 would allow the adversary to distinguish between the two sequences by simply decrypting the contents of V_{pub} (using the known K_{pub}) and comparing the decrypted *data*. Fortunately, a similar comparison is not possible for V_{hid} since K_{hid} is not accessible to the adversary.

The restriction imposed by ϕ ensures that the adversary may not trivially distinguish between \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 by providing sequences of different “true lengths” – the number of actual blocks modified in the write trace generated by a given access pattern. Specifically, for a given ϕ , PD-CPA assumes that the true length of a sequence with k writes to V_{pub} is $k \times \phi$. Since, \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 have the *same* writes to V_{pub} , their true lengths are the same. The additional ϕ writes in the corresponding write traces generated for the sequences allows hid-

ing writes to V_{hid} . Thus, if the number of writes to V_{hid} exceed the number allowable by ϕ , the sequences become trivially distinguishable by their true lengths.

Relationship with existing work. PD-CPA is similar to the hidden volume encryption game in [7] with the notable difference that PD-CPA empowers the adversary further by giving her the ability to choose the input device. This consideration is regarding a practical scenario where an oppressive regime officer might be aware of particular underlying properties of a storage device. Thus, a PD-CPA secure solution should not be reliant on the properties of a particular kind of storage device that can be used by the challenger, as that in itself would be suspicious to the adversary³.

Definition 2. A storage mechanism is “plausibly deniable” if it ensures that \mathcal{A} cannot win any round of the corresponding PD-CPA game with a non-negligible advantage (in the security parameter λ) over random guessing.

3.3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for PD-CPA

DataLair provides a plausibly deniable solution defeating a PD-CPA adversary. We note informally here (and prove later) that the following conditions are necessary and sufficient to ensure PD-CPA security.

1. Indistinguishability between hidden data write access patterns (“access pattern indistinguishability”, HWA).
2. Indistinguishability between write traces that include public data accesses with one (or more) hidden data accesses, and the *same* public data accesses without *any* hidden data accesses (“access type indistinguishability”, PAT).

Indistinguishability between hidden write access patterns (HWA). Recall that in PD-CPA, the adversary can include writes to V_{hid} in both \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 . If the write traces were distinguishable, the two sequences would become distinguishable to an adversary providing different accesses to V_{hid} in the sequences.

Note that HWA indistinguishability also ensures that writes to the same logical location in V_{hid} in two

³ For example, [23] exploits the variations in the programming time of a flash device to hide data by encoding bits in the programming time of individual cells.

different rounds of PD-CPA results in write traces that are independently distributed and thus prevents an adversary from “linking” accesses to the same logical location in successive rounds. In the absence of this “unlinkability”, an adversary could provide the same accesses to V_{hid} as part of \mathcal{O}_1 in successive rounds with only writes (possibly different) to V_{pub} as \mathcal{O}_0 . On observing the same write traces for successive rounds, the adversary could correctly predict that the sequence executed is \mathcal{O}_1 .

Indistinguishability between public access write traces (PAT). In PD-CPA, an adversary can provide \mathcal{O}_0 with only accesses to V_{pub} and \mathcal{O}_1 with accesses to both V_{pub} and V_{hid} and win trivially if the sequences’ write traces were distinguishable. In effect, to ensure PD-CPA security, **in case \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 include the same public data operations, they should be indistinguishable.** Note that both sequences should contain the *same* public data operations since otherwise they are trivially distinguishable on the basis of any additional public operation that is performed, as discussed above. This is why the write trace due to a sequence of public data operations plus (one or more) hidden data write(s) should be indistinguishable from the write trace due to accesses including the *same* public data operations without any hidden data write(s).

Theorem 1. *A storage mechanism is PD-CPA secure iff. it guarantees indistinguishability between hidden write access patterns (HWA) and indistinguishability between public operations with and without hidden writes (PAT).*

See appendix for the detailed proof.

4 Access Pattern Indistinguishability

Section 3 shows that one of the necessary conditions to plausibly deny the existence of a logical volume to a multi-snapshot adversary, is to ensure indistinguishability of hidden data write access patterns (HWA).

A straightforward solution here is to use an oblivious RAM (ORAM) which allows a client/CPU to hide its data access patterns from an untrusted server/RAM hosting the accessed data. Informally, ORAMs prevent an adversary from distinguishing between equal length sequences of queries made by a client to the server. This usually also includes indistinguishability between reads

and writes. We refer to the vast amount of existing literature on ORAMs for more formal definitions [10, 22].

Write-only ORAM. As noted by Blass *et al.* [7], an off-the-shelf full ORAM is simply too powerful since it protects both read and write accesses – while for PD only write access patterns are of concern. In this case, a write-only ORAM [7, 12] can be deployed which provides access pattern privacy against an adversary that can monitor only writes.

Logical vs. practical complexity. ORAM literature traditionally defines access complexity as the number of logical blocks of data accessed per I/O. This allows optimizations by using logical blocks of smaller size [19, 21]. However, it is important to note that standard off-the-shelf block-based storage devices can access data only in units of physical blocks (sectors). For example, accessing a 256 byte logical block still entails accessing the corresponding 4KB block from the disk. Thus, in the context of locally deployed block-based storage devices, practical complexity needs to be measured in terms of the number of physical blocks (sectors) accessed per I/O.

HIVE-ORAM. The most bandwidth-efficient write-only ORAM is the construction by Blass *et al.* [7] (further referred to as HIVE-ORAM). HIVE-ORAM [7] maps data from a logical address space uniformly randomly to the physical blocks on the underlying device. The position map for the ORAM is recursively stored in $O(\log N)$ smaller ORAMs, a standard technique introduced in [19]. The recursive technique reduces the logical block access complexity for the position map by storing the position map blocks in logical blocks of *smaller* sizes. Under this assumption, HIVE-ORAM [7] accesses a *constant* number of logical blocks per ORAM operation at the cost of some overflow that is stored in an in-memory stash.

Unfortunately, as noted in [7], with physical blocks of uniform size, HIVE-ORAM has a practical block read complexity (number of blocks read) of $O(\log_\beta N)$ and a practical block write complexity (number of blocks written) of $O(\log_\beta^2 N)$ where $\beta = B/2 * addr$, B is the physical block size in bytes and $addr$ is the size of one logical/physical block address in bytes. This is because to perform a write, HIVE-ORAM [7] needs to update all $\log_\beta N$ position map ORAMs recursively and updating each ORAM requires $O(\log_\beta N)$ accesses to find free blocks. More specifically, to find free blocks in an ORAM, a constant number of randomly chosen physical blocks are selected and then the position map for that ORAM is checked to determine free blocks within the sample. Consequently, with $O(\log_\beta N)$ block read com-

plexity of each position map ORAM, the overall write complexity of HIVE-ORAM is $O(\log_\beta^2 N)$.

DL-ORAM. We propose DL-ORAM, a new efficient write-only ORAM scheme with a practical block write complexity of $O(\log_\beta N)$. Similar to [7], DL-ORAM maps blocks from the logical address space to uniformly random blocks in the physical address space. The DL-ORAM construction however is significantly different and incorporates two key optimizations.

First, DL-ORAM eliminates the need for recursive position map ORAMs by storing the position map as a B+ tree, indexed by the logical block addresses. The tree is stored along with the data within the same ORAM address space, thus judiciously utilizing space. Second, DL-ORAM uses a novel $O(1)$ scheme for identifying uniformly random free blocks using an auxiliary encrypted data structure. This allows writes with $O(\log_\beta N)$ communication complexity. We detail below.

4.1 Position Map

In DL-ORAM, all blocks are stored encrypted with a semantically secure cipher. Further, DL-ORAM stores the logical to physical block address mappings in a B+ tree indexed on the logical data block address. Logical and physical addresses are assumed to be of the same size. The position map tree is stored on the device with *each* node stored in an *individual* physical block. Each *leaf* node stores a sorted list of logical block addresses along with the corresponding physical block addresses they are mapped to.

Further, the leaf nodes are ordered from left to right, e.g., the left-most leaf node contains the entries for logical block addresses in the range of 1 to β . This ensures that the (i/β) -th leaf node always contains the mapping for logical block address i . If a logical block is currently not mapped (e.g. when the block hasn't been written to yet by the upper layer), the entry corresponding to that address in the map is set to null.

For traversal, each internal node stores only the list of physical block address of the node's children. Note that since the leaves are ordered on logical addresses, the index within an internal node determines the child node to visit next in order to retrieve a path corresponding to a particular logical block address. Searching for a particular logical block address mapping requires reading all the blocks along a path from the root to the leaf that contains the mapping for that logical block ID. As each node is stored in a physical block, the number of block addresses that can be stored in each leaf node is




Fig. 1. DL-ORAM. The position map blocks are randomly interleaved with the data blocks within the same address space.

bound by the physical block size, β . Consequently, the depth of the tree is bounded by $\log_\beta(N)$ with a fanout of β . Thus, querying the map for a particular logical to physical block address mapping requires $\log_\beta(N)$ block accesses.

The position map shares the same physical address space with the ORAM data blocks. Specifically, the B+ tree blocks are assigned a logical block address and are written to random physical blocks interleaved with the data blocks, using the ORAM protocols. The physical location of the tree root is stored at a known location outside the ORAM address space (intuition explained later). Semantic security of the cipher used ensures that the position map blocks are indistinguishable from the data blocks in the ORAM.

DL-ORAM supports two operations: *read_oram* and *write_oram*. Detailed pseudocode can be found in the Appendix.

read_oram(id) returns the data in the block with logical block address id . It locates the mapping for id in the B+ tree and returns the data stored in the corresponding physical block.

write_oram(id, d) writes data d to the block with logical block address id . It first determines the entry corresponding to id in the B+ tree and then writes data d to a new free block. Finally, the map is updated corresponding to id . The mechanism for finding a free block is described next in Section 4.2

Finally, updating the map requires recursively writing all the nodes along the the specific path of the B+ tree to new free blocks to ensure indistinguishability between map blocks and data blocks. Specifically, the updated leaf node (after adding the entry for id) is written to a selected new free block. This results in its parent node being modified and being mapped to a new free location. Consequently, on an ORAM write, all the blocks from the root of the map to the corresponding leaf node are modified and remapped to new locations.

To ensure that the recursion terminates, the physical location of the tree root is always stored at a known fixed location as described before. For DL-ORAM, this information is held at a fixed location on the disk where the physical block address of the root is written encrypted and is modified for each access. Once the root data is also modified and remapped to a new physical block, this information is updated.

4.2 Finding Free Blocks

A major challenge for write-only ORAMs is selecting uniformly random free blocks from the distribution of all free blocks on the device for writing data. Writing thusly eliminates correlations between the logical data block addresses and their physical locations, thus rendering an adversary incapable of linking modifications to physical blocks with the corresponding modifications to logical blocks. Even when data already in the ORAM needs to be updated, it is relocated to a new random location to prevent correlation with previous writes.

DL-ORAM deploys a new $O(1)$ scheme for identifying uniformly random free blocks using an auxiliary encrypted data structure. This allows writes with $O(\log_\beta(N))$ access complexity. This is achieved by storing free block addresses in a novel encrypted data structure – the *free block matrix* (FBM). The FBM is designed with the two following properties – i) it allows retrieval of uniformly random elements in $O(1)$ accesses, and ii) it does not reveal the actual number of elements that it contains at any given point in time. Ensuring (i) allows efficient retrieval of random free block addresses in our scheme (as we detail later). (ii) ensures that the actual number of data blocks in the ORAM is not revealed thus preventing possible correlations.

Free Block Matrix (FBM). The FBM is an encrypted $\beta \times N/\beta$ matrix (where N is the total number of physical blocks in the ORAM and β is number of physical block addresses that can be written to one disk block) that stores the addresses of all currently free blocks. The columns of the matrix are stored in *consecutive* disk blocks outside the ORAM, each containing β free block addresses (Figure 2). The coordinates in the matrix where each block address is stored is randomized independent of the address. Since all blocks are free at initialization, the FBM is initialized with all N entries containing a randomly chosen disk block address.

As physical blocks are used for writing data, the corresponding block addresses need to be removed from the FBM. This is achieved by *invalidating* entries (de-




Fig. 2. FBM design. The FBM is a matrix with $\beta = B/addr$ rows and N/β columns, containing N entries. Each entry of the matrix is a physical block ID. Each column of the FBM is stored in a disk block. A special “FBM header” array is in stores the number of physical block IDs per row. The FBM requires $N/\beta + 1$ disk blocks for storage – N/β columns and 1 FBM Header. The figure illustrates an example FBM configuration with 9 entries. The first row has two invalid entry as indicated by the FBM header.

scribed next) when the corresponding blocks are used for ORAM writes. In this case, to track the number of valid entries in the FBM, the **FBM header** block stores a block-sized array tracking the number of valid entries per FBM *row*.

More specifically, the FBM header contains an entry for each row indicating the number of valid entries currently present in that row. Since each row can contain N/β valid entries (corresponding to the number of columns), each entry in the FBM header is of size $\log(N/\beta)$. For β rows, the total number of entries in the FBM header is $\beta \times \log(N/\beta)$. Also, $\beta \leq B/\log N$ with B as the block size and each physical address of length at least equal to $\log N$. Then for $\beta > 1$,

$$\beta \times \log(N/\beta) \leq \beta \times \log N \leq B/\log N \times \log N \leq B$$

Hence, the FBM header always fits in one physical block if $B > \log N$. With standard 4KB block size on off-the-shelf storage disks, the FBM header requires more than one block ($B < \log N$) only if the disk has more than 2^{4096} blocks in total

Figure 2 describes the FBM design.

Selection from the FBM. The FBM allows selection of uniformly random block addresses with two disk block accesses as follows – select a random i in the range of the total number of valid entries in the FBM. Then, determine the coordinate of the i^{th} entry in the FBM by counting valid entries *row-wise* – this is straightforward since the header stores the number of valid entries per row. The block address at that coordinate is then retrieved from the corresponding location.




Fig. 3. Example of FBM with 9 entries. In (a), the FBM header correctly determines that the 3rd valid entry is at (2,2) since there is 1 valid entry in the first row and 3 in the second. In (b), the 3rd valid entry is determined incorrectly since the FBM header correctly indicates that the second row has 2 valid entries but does not show which columns have the valid entries.

If the block is subsequently used (possibly for a new write), it is *invalidated* by reducing the valid entry count for the corresponding row in the FBM header. Consequently, for subsequent accesses the FBM header indicates that the row has one less valid entry. Note that invalidating an entry does not entail removing it from the disk block storing the FBM column, rather the FBM header is updated to ensure that the entry is not used in subsequent accesses.

An important condition for correctness of this mechanism is to ensure that a location determined from the FBM header always contains a valid entry. A possible scenario where this might be violated is shown in Figure 3 where the FBM incorrectly points to a location that contains an invalid entry. The problem in this case is due the presence of invalid entries between valid entries (as in Figure 3(b)). Here, the FBM header correctly indicates that the second row has 2 valid entries but does not indicate the columns with the valid entries. Determining the exact coordinate at which the valid entry is present is non-trivial given that the header only records the *number* of valid entries in a row but *not* their corresponding locations. Consequently, with *gaps* between valid entries in the FBM (as in Figure 3), the selection mechanism described above can erroneously return block addresses (corresponding to invalid entries) that are already being used.

Compacting the FBM. To ensure correctness, DL-ORAM maintains the following invariant – all **invalid** entries in the FBM appear **before** all **valid** entries when the FBM is traversed *row-wise*. This requires all valid entries in a particular row to be invalidated first before invalidating an entry from the next row in sequence – e.g., all entries in the first row are invalidated be-




Fig. 4. Compacting the FBM. Invalid entries appear before valid entries when entries are traversed *row-wise*. In the example, 7 was selected randomly from (2,3) which was replaced by 5 from (1,2) to ensure compactness.

fore the second row etc. Since, entries are selected randomly from the FBM, DL-ORAM performs an extra *compaction* step to maintain the invariant.

The *compaction* replaces a randomly selected valid entry from the FBM by another valid entry which is selected *row-wise* from the FBM. This replacement entry is the *first* valid entry that is encountered while counting valid entries per row sequentially from the FBM header. After the replacement, the FBM header is updated.

For example, in Figure 4, 7 is uniformly randomly selected (and invalidated) from coordinate (2,3) in the FBM using the protocol described above. This leads to a configuration that violates the invariant. Then for compaction, 5 is copied from coordinate (1,2) to (2,3) and the entry at (1,2) is invalidated. Note that the entry at (1,2) is the *first* valid entry encountered while traversing the FBM row-wise. Also, even though the FBM now contains duplicate block addresses at (1,2) and (2,3), the block address at (1,2) will not be used subsequently during uniform selection since the FBM header correctly indicates that row 1 has one valid entry. Due the invariant, this single valid entry has to be present at (1,3).

Compaction straightforwardly ensures the invariant since randomly selected entries are replaced by entries that are selected *row-wise* and subsequently invalidated. To summarize, the compaction modifies two blocks – the header and the block from which the random entry is selected and replaced.

Moreover, in certain cases this compaction is not required. For instance, when a free block address is to be added to the FBM and a new random free block address is required in turn. Recall that this is indeed the case for updates to DL-ORAM blocks – the updated data is written to a new free block while the block containing the previous data is now free and the corresponding free block address can be added back to the FBM. In this case, the new randomly chosen free block address can

be directly replaced by the free block address that is to be added back to the FBM. Note that due to the direct replacement, the header does not need to be updated.

In order to ensure that such an access looks indistinguishable from an access with compaction – otherwise an adversary could identify accesses which are simply updates to existing blocks and thus deduce the actual number of data blocks in the ORAM – the FBM header is reencrypted along with the modification to the block where the replacement takes place. Due to semantic security, reencryption of the header is indistinguishable from actual modification during compaction.

Finally, note that entries are added back to the FBM only as part of updates (as described above). DL-ORAM does not support deletes since modern filesystems do not indicate deletes to block devices. Specifically, FS such as ext4 only update its internal metadata to track blocks that have been deleted while the deleted data is overwritten only when the block is subsequently allocated for writing new data. Thus, when DL-ORAM is used with an overlying filesystem mounted logical volume (the deployment scenario considered here), deletes are logically equivalent to updates and the deleted data is updated with new data in future accesses.

Uniform free block selection As discussed, the FBM provides an efficient mechanism for determining uniformly random free block addresses for ORAM writes with $O(1)$ access complexity. Unfortunately, writing to blocks only selected from the FBM for every write, can result in certain blocks in the ORAM never being modified. For instance, consider a block containing data that is never updated. This block is never subsequently modified in the ORAM after the first write since the block never becomes free again. This can leak subtle correlations since an adversary can differentiate between disk blocks that are being updated frequently from locations that are not updated since they were first written.

To solve this, DL-ORAM deploys an $O(1)$ free block selection scheme using the FBM, that modifies uniformly random locations in the ORAM and thus prevents any block level correlations. The intuition is to always modify k (a chosen constant) random disk blocks while also finding a free block.

For every ORAM write, DL-ORAM creates two sets, each with k items as follows –

1. A *free set* that contains k randomly chosen free block addresses from the FBM.
2. A *random set* that contains k randomly chosen block addresses out of all the blocks in the ORAM.

In case of duplicate items between the sets, one of the duplicates is randomly discarded while a new item is selected either to the free set or the combined set depending on the set from which the item was discarded. Then, items from the two sets are merged randomly to create a *combined set*.

Selection Protocol. Using the combined set DL-ORAM, executes the following protocol –

1. Select an item randomly from the combined set.
2. If the item, i selected in step 1 originally belonged to the *free set*, use the corresponding block for the ORAM write. Otherwise, reencrypt the block corresponding to the block address selected. Remove the item from the combined set.
3. Repeat steps 1-3, k times.
4. For all the remaining items, i , that are also in the *free set*, replace the addresses back in the FBM from where they were selected.

Lemma 1. *The sample of k physical blocks modified for every ORAM write (due to the selection protocol) is indistinguishable from a sample of k blocks selected uniformly at random out of the N physical blocks in the ORAM.*

Proof. The idea here is to show that the probability of a block x being selected (and modified) randomly in a sample of k blocks out of N , is the same as the probability of x being one of the k blocks chosen by the selection protocol. Let X denote the event of x being chosen uniformly at random in a sample of k blocks out of N . Then, straightforwardly $Pr[X] = k/N$.

Next, consider the process of building the *free set*. Let $Pr[x \in FBM]$ denote the probability that x is currently in the FBM. Since the FBM is initialized with all N block addresses and for each access, entries are selected (and invalidated) uniformly randomly, all N block addresses are equally likely to be present and valid in the FBM during the current access. More specifically, all the N initial entries are equally likely to have been invalidated in the writes that have preceded this access. Thus, $Pr[x \in FBM] = f/N$ when f is the current number of valid entries in the FBM.

Let E_1 be the event that x is selected into the *free set* – x is one of k randomly chosen block addresses selected from the FBM to form the free set. This conditionally depends on x being present in the FBM. Thus, $Pr[E_1] = Pr[x \in k | x \in FBM] = Pr[x \in k] \times Pr[x \in FBM] = k/f \times f/N = k/N$ since the event that x is selected as

one of the k items from the FBM is independent of x being present in the FBM.

Now, since the *random set* is created by selecting k random block address out of all N , the event that x is selected into the random set, E_2 straightforwardly has the probability, $Pr[E_2] = k/N$. Thus, x has equal probability of being added to the *combined set* from either the *free set* or the *random set*. Note that the combined set has size $2k$.

Let X' be the event of x being selected for modification by the protocol. The goal here is to show $Pr[X] = Pr[X']$. X' depends on x being chosen either to free set or the random set (E_1 and E_2) and x being selected in one of the rounds of the protocol, denoted by event Y . Thus, $Pr[X'] = Pr[Y] \times Pr[E_1UE_2]$.

Let $Y = Y_1 + Y_2 + \dots + Y_k$ where Y_i is the event that x is selected in the i^{th} round of the protocol. Also, since x can be selected only once (selection without replacement), probability of x being selected in the i^{th} round conditionally depends on x not being selected in previous rounds⁴. Then,

$$Pr[Y = Y_i] = Pr[Y_i | Y \neq Y_{i-1}, Y_{i-2}, \dots, Y_1]$$

Note that for round i , an item is selected from the combined set with probability $1/(2k-i)$ since previously selected items are removed without replacement.

$$\text{Now, } Pr[Y = Y_1] = 1/2k.$$

$$Pr[Y = Y_2] = Pr[Y_2 | Y \neq Y_1] = 1/(2k-1) \times Pr[Y \neq Y_1] = 1/2k.$$

It can be similarly shown that $Pr[Y = Y_i] = 1/2k \forall i \in k$. Thus,

$$Pr[Y] = \sum_{i=1}^{i=k} Pr[Y = Y_i] = 1/2.$$

Finally, $Pr[X'] = Pr[Y] \times Pr[E_1UE_2] = 1/2 \times 2k/N = k/N$, thus proving $Pr[X'] = Pr[X]$. \square

Stash. If none of the k rounds yields a free block, the data is written to an in-memory stash. Since, initially there are equal number of items from the *free set* and the *random set* in the combined set and uniformly random items are selected each round, k rounds of the protocol yields an expected $k/2$ number of items from the *free set*. If $k = 3$, the DL-ORAM stash can be modeled as a $D/M/1$ queue similar to [7], and bound to a constant

⁴ Y follows a hypergeometric distribution with $2k$ population size, k draws and 1 observed and possible success state. Thus, the following could also be derived straightforwardly using the probability mass function for the distribution.

size with negligible failure probability in the security parameter. We refer to [7] for details.

Device utilization. A final detail is to ensure that the expected number of free blocks obtained from the selection protocol does not exceed the expected number of free blocks obtained from an equal-sized sample selected randomly out of all the blocks in the ORAM. Otherwise, the protocol will always yield an expected $k/2$ free blocks unlike a randomly selected sample where the expected number of free blocks will be a function of the actual distribution of data. Note that lemma 1 shows indistinguishability between a randomly selected sample and the sample obtained due to the modification in Step 2 of the protocol for *each* write. However, a significant difference in the expected number of free blocks obtained can leak subtle correlations over *multiple* rounds. Fortunately, a straightforward solution for this is to ensure that half of the ORAM blocks are always free. Note that a similar assumption is also made by HIVE [7] but for a different purpose, namely to bound the in-memory stash for the write protocol.

Lemma 2. *If half of the ORAM blocks are always ensured to be free, the expected number of free blocks provided by the selection protocol per write is equivalent to the expected number of free blocks in a sample of k blocks randomly selected out of all N blocks in the ORAM.*

Proof. Note that a free block can be obtained by the protocol only if an item is selected from the *free set* in Step 1, for at least 1 out of the k rounds. Since, the rounds are independent, it can be straightforwardly observed that the expected number of free blocks yielded by the selection protocol is $k/2$. This is equal to the expected number of free blocks in a randomly selected sample of k blocks, if half of the blocks in the ORAM are always free. \square

Access Complexity. Both `read_oram()` and `write_oram()` access the ORAM map to locate the target block. The complexity of accessing an entry in the B+ tree is $O(\log_\beta N)$. Further, `write_oram()` needs to find and write to $O(\log_\beta N)$ free blocks for writing data and updating the map blocks. Finding a free block requires $O(1)$ accesses as discussed above, and thus the write complexity of DL-ORAM is $O(\log_\beta N)$. Consequently, the overall access complexity of DL-ORAM is $O(B \times \log_\beta(N))$.

Lemma 3. *DL-ORAM provides write access pattern indistinguishability.*

Proof. This follows directly from the ORAM properties. For every DL-ORAM write, $\log_\beta(N) + 1$ blocks need to be written to the ORAM ($\log_\beta(N)$ blocks for updating the position map and one data block that needs to be written/updated). Free blocks for writing these blocks are randomly chosen and modified independently of the logical block address that the user wants to write at. In fact, for any given access pattern, $A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots\}$ and its corresponding write trace $B = \{b_1, b_2, \dots\}$, the selection of the blocks in B is independent of the blocks in A since B is composed of uniformly randomly selected blocks from the disk (Lemma 1). Thus, observing B does not leak any information about A to the computationally-bounded adversary. Further since the elements in B are randomly and uniformly chosen, the write trace of any access pattern $C \neq A$ is indistinguishable from the write trace for A .

Finally, each access results in writes to blocks of the position map along with the block that the user wants to access. Position map and data blocks are re-encrypted with semantic security and thus indistinguishable. This reduces the security of DL-ORAM to the security of the underlying semantically secure encryption. \square

Simulating a write. Note that all *write_oram* accesses have indistinguishable write traces – modifying $k \times (\log_\beta N + 1)$ randomly selected ORAM data blocks, FBM blocks, and the FBM header block. Consequently, a *write_oram* access can be simulated even with random data stored in the ORAM and the FBM by randomly selecting and re-randomizing an equal number of ORAM blocks, FBM blocks and FBM header. Due to semantic security, re-randomizing blocks with random data is indistinguishable from reencrypting a block with valid data. We use this property of DL-ORAM as a basis for the solution described in Section 5.

5 Access Type Indistinguishability

We now detail the design of DataLair, which ensures HWA by deploying DL-ORAM (Section 4) and PAT through its access protocols described below. For PAT, DataLair ensures that a device containing both public and hidden data is indistinguishable from a device containing only public data.

First, we describe a simple secure design, DataLair *Lite*, which sacrifices storage space for reduced design complexity. Section 5.2, introduces a more complex but space-efficient design dubbed DataLair *Full*.




Fig. 5. Design of DataLair *Lite*. Writes to the hidden partition happen through DL-ORAM.

5.1 DataLair Lite: Isolating Volumes

Setup. DataLair Lite maps blocks from *two* logical volumes to an underlying block device and can be set up in two modes of operation – *ONLY_PUB* (only public) and *PUB_HID* (public and hidden). In the *ONLY_PUB* mode, the device only stores data from a “public” logical volume that is disclosed to an adversary. For *PUB_HID* mode, DataLair Lite also stores data from a hidden volume. DataLair Lite fixes the size of each volume to 50% of the underlying physical device size. Each logical volume may support a filesystem. DataLair Lite creates two physical partitions on the device – a public partition and a hidden partition, according to the corresponding logical volume sizes (Figure 5). When, DataLair Lite is initialized in *ONLY_PUB* mode, the hidden partition is filled with random data.

The underlying storage is a block device with N blocks of size B each and physical block address $P_{id} \in [1, N]$. The format of the address would vary across different types of block devices, e.g., in case of a hard disk, the physical block address would be the sector numbers that constitute one block on the physical device.

Logical block addresses $V_{id} \in [1, |V_{id}|]$ are used to reference blocks in the logical volumes ($|V_{id}|$ is the size of the volume). The logical blocks are mapped to the physical blocks using a device mapper. Data from the public volume is mapped to the public partition directly (as indicated by the overlying FS) while data from the hidden volume is mapped to the hidden partition using DL-ORAM. In addition, semantically secure encryption is used to encrypt all data and metadata before writing. Public data is encrypted with a key K_{pub} available to the adversary. Hidden data is encrypted with secret key K_{hid} . In practice, keys may be derived from user passwords.

I/O. DataLair Lite maps logical volume I/O into either public or hidden volume operations.

Public reads and writes are straightforward since DataLair Lite can linearly translate the logical block address and perform a read/write to the corresponding physical block in the public partition. A read to the hidden volume calls *read_oram* on the hidden partition. In addition, to ensure PD, with *every* public write, DataLair Lite performs a hidden operation as follows:

- If there is a write queued up for the hidden logical volume, it is performed by calling *write_oram*.
- In the absence of a write for the hidden volume, or if DataLair Lite is used in *ONLY_PUB* mode, a write is *simulated* for DL-ORAM (as described in Section 4).

Effectively, this ensures that every write to the hidden volume is preceded by a write to the public volume. If there is no public write when a hidden write request arrives at DataLair Lite, the hidden data is queued in the DL-ORAM stash. With every write to the public volume, either an outstanding write (or data from the stash) is written to the hidden volume (using DL-ORAM) or a write is *simulated*. As shown before, these two cases are indistinguishable to an adversary without the key for DL-ORAM.

Security. The construction described above provides PD for the hidden volume. First, both the *ONLY_PUB* and *PUB_HID* modes of operations create public and hidden partitions of equal size. A write to the public volume in both the cases results in indistinguishable modifications to the hidden partition – either due to an actual write or a simulation. This guarantees PAT indistinguishability. Further, deploying DL-ORAM on the hidden partition ensures HWA indistinguishability. Recall that these are the necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure PD-CPA security.

5.2 DataLair Full: Merging Volumes

Although, DataLair Lite (Section 5.1) achieves PD, it makes sub-optimal use of storage space – e.g., in *ONLY_PUB* mode, a hidden partition uses up 50% of the space allocated to it, notwithstanding of actual use. A more reasonable solution would allow physical volume storage space to correspond to logical use requirements. Further, space not used for hidden data should be available for public data and vice-versa.

To this end, DataLair Full allows the user to create two (or more) volumes of variable sizes and stores them on the *same* physical partition. In this case, both the public and the hidden volume can be of the same logical

size as the underlying partition and use all the available space (in this case up to 50% of total device size) for either hidden or public data. We provide the intuition for the restricted device usage further below.

Unfortunately, achieving this is significantly more challenging than the *Lite* construction – the main problem being mapping public data to independent locations in the presence of hidden data. We detail below.

Mapping Public Data. First, with both public and hidden data being stored within the same physical address space, writing public data straightforwardly to physical blocks indicated by an overlying filesystem is not possible. Since DataLair does not restrict the choice of filesystem, the distribution of public data will also determine the distribution of hidden data. For example, with a log structured filesystem on the public volume, all hidden data will end up being “pushed” towards the end of the disk. This breaks the security of the random free block selection mechanism in DL-ORAM. Instead, public data will need to be mapped *randomly* without compromising overall PD. This requires storing a corresponding mapping table for the public volume .

Public Position Map (PPM). DataLair Full stores the logical to physical block address mappings for public data in an array called the *Public Position Map* (PPM), stored at a fixed device location. The PPM is similar to the mapping table used by most device mappers. Importantly, the PPM is considered to be public data and thus not subject to PD.

To proceed, it is necessary to define two important terms here to categorize physical blocks on the basis of their state of occupancy: *truly free* and *apparently free*. **Truly free block:** a block that does not contain any (public or hidden) data. **Apparently free block:** a block that contains hidden data and the use of which needs to be hidden from an adversary, i.e., the block needs to “appear” free to an adversary.

To maintain PD, public data writes should not avoid *apparently free* blocks by writing *around* hidden data. Thus, while writing public data to randomly selected blocks, DataLair must ensure that *all* free blocks (including *truly free* and *apparently free*) are equally likely to get selected to complete the write. An obvious solution then is to choose a random block and write the public data there if it is unoccupied. If the block is *apparently free*, the hidden data there can be relocated to a new random location subsequently.

This approach however creates a significant problem. Recall that DL-ORAM writes hidden data by deploying the uniform free block selection protocol (de-




Fig. 6. Sample PFL with 7 entries. Each entry in the FMA is a physical block address. The reverse mapping array (RMA) stores an index pointer to the forward mapping array (FMA) for a particular entry.

tailed in Section 4.2), using the FBM for selecting “free” block addresses. In the current context, to ensure correctness, the FBM should contain addresses of only *truly free* blocks, i.e., blocks that do not contain either public or hidden data. Thus, randomly choosing a block for writing public data will also require the corresponding block address to be invalidated in the FBM. Otherwise, the FBM will contain block addresses that are already occupied by public data. If such a block address is selected for a subsequent hidden write, the public data in the block will have to be moved elsewhere (leaking the presence of hidden data) to complete the write. Unfortunately, invalidating a particular randomly chosen block address in the FBM is not straightforward – by construction the location of a block address in the FBM is randomized.

The solution then is to select block addresses for public writes also from the FBM while updating the FBM in the process. The problem however with naively implementing this is that the FBM is hidden data i.e., the FBM is encrypted with the DL-ORAM secret key. Thus, using the FBM for public writes would entail the user to provide the FBM key to the adversary since all public operations and data structures in DataLair needs to be transparent to the adversary for PD. Providing the FBM key to the adversary breaks the security of DL-ORAM if hidden data is also stored.

Public Free List (PFL). To solve this, DataLair selects free block addresses from the FBM but also provides a way to *plausibly deny* this. The idea is to store a public (encrypted with the public key) list of block addresses corresponding to the blocks that do not contain public data. The list further supports the following two properties: i) it allows efficient retrieval of uniformly random entries, and ii) the location of any given *entry* in the list can be determined efficiently. We detail below.

The PFL (Figure 6) is a data structure keeping track of block addresses of blocks that *do not* contain

public data. The PFL is public (not subject to deniability) and is composed of two arrays:

1. The *forward mapping array* (FMA) (size N) of block addresses that currently do not contain public data (*apparently free + truly free*). Uniformly random block addresses can be selected by picking up the entry at a randomly selected index in the array. If the selected entry is to be removed from the PFL (use case described later), the array is subsequently *compacted*, by moving the entry at the end of the array to the index corresponding to the removed item. The compacting ensures that the *real* size of the array is always known and entries can be picked uniformly.
2. The *reverse mapping array* (RMA) (size N) tracks the index in the forward mapping array corresponding to each physical block address. Whenever an entry is removed/added or replaced in the forward mapping array, the reverse mapping array is updated as well.

The intuition behind the PFL is that the FMA allows DataLair to efficiently select and retrieve a free block address that does not contain public data, while the RMA allows efficiently locating the index of a particular free block address in the forward mapping array.

Public write free block selection. DataLair Full performs the public write free block selection as follows. First, the uniform free block selection protocol using the FBM is deployed as described in Section 4.2. More specifically, for a public write, DataLair Full creates a *free set* and the *random set*. In addition, now the *random set* can be built by using random block addresses from the PFL because the blocks that already contain public data (and thus not part of the PFL) can be trivially excluded as being occupied. This is followed by executing the k rounds of the protocol using the combined set. If the protocol yields a free block address then the data is written to that block. Then, using the RMA, DataLair Full determines the location of the block address in the FMA, which is subsequently removed. This allows DataLair Full to claim that the block address was actually selected from the PFL.

If the protocol yields no free blocks, the data is still written to the disk (instead of being added to the in-memory stash). The idea here is to ensure that a public write always translates to a write to the disk. Since the modifications to blocks not containing public data (due to a hidden write or DL-ORAM simulation) are attributed to public data writes, writing public data to

the stash can result in inconsistent modifications on the disk and violate PD.

To implement this, when the selection protocol does not yield a *truly free* block for a public write, the public data is instead written to an *apparently free* block. The hidden data there can then be moved to the stash and written back in a subsequent hidden write. An *apparently free* block address can be straightforwardly selected from the DL-ORAM position map, which as described before stores the logical to physical address mappings for data in the ORAM (hidden data in this case). Subsequently, this block address is removed from the PFL. Note that the PFL necessarily contains this address, since it contains entries of *all* blocks not containing public data – which also includes blocks that already contain hidden data (*apparently free* blocks). Thus, a free block address selected using this procedure can also be attributed to being selected from the PFL

Hidden write free block selection. Hidden writes follow the same procedure as DataLair Lite by invoking the DL-ORAM write protocol. However unlike public writes, hidden data is still written to the stash if the selection protocol yields no free blocks. Recall that one of the requirements for a bounded DL-ORAM stash is to ensure that half of the ORAM is free. In this case, since DL-ORAM will write to the blocks which are shared with public data, it necessary to ensure that the combined size of public and hidden data is only half the size of the device. This is achieved by the DataLair device mapper only allowing the user to create logical volumes with size equal to or less than half of the device capacity. Further, on reaching 50% utilization, the device mapper informs the user that the disk is full.

Indistinguishability between two modes of operation. Recall that in the *ONLY_PUB* mode, DL-ORAM and the FBM is initialized with random data. Thus, the free block selection mechanism for public data writes described above (using the FBM) cannot be deployed in this case. Fortunately, to overcome this the PFL can be used to efficiently select uniformly random free block addresses. Once the address has been selected and removed from the FMA, the array is compacted.

Further, to ensure indistinguishability, the accesses due to the uniform free block selection using the FBM is simulated by reencrypting the required number of FBM blocks and required number of random block addresses selected from the PFL.

In summary (Figure 7), when writing public data in *ONLY_PUB* mode, a randomly chosen block address is removed from the PFL while simulating the uniform




Fig. 7. Free block selection protocol for public writes in DataLair Full. Step 1 is indistinguishable for the two cases since simulation to the FBM is indistinguishable from a real access. Using either the PFL or the free block selection protocol in step 2 provides uniformly random block addresses of blocks that do not contain public data. The entry selected by the selection protocol in step 2 will be at a random index in the FMA as all entries in the FBM are randomized independent of their locations in the FMA.

free block selection protocol. In *PUB_HID* mode, the randomly chosen block address for writing public data is determined using the free block selection protocol while removing its corresponding address from the PFL. The two cases are indistinguishable since an actual access to DL-ORAM and the FBM is indistinguishable from a simulation.

Storing metadata for encryption. Since encryption is performed at the block level and the reverse mapping array contain an entry for each disk block, the IVs/counters for the randomized semantically secure cipher used to encrypt the physical blocks are stored in the reverse mapping array.

Optimization: in-place updates for public data. When a public block is written for the first time (insert), it requires searching for a random free block as described above, but subsequent updates can be made in-place, thus avoiding additional accesses for finding free blocks and updating the PPM.

Storing the stash. The in-memory stash is stored to the disk at a graceful power-down. DataLair Full allocates a fixed location to store the constant-sized stash. On power-down, the stash is written encrypted to that location. If the stash is empty or not being used (in case




Fig. 8. DataLair full design with the four main components: DL-ORAM, PPM, PFL and FBM. Hidden data I/O is mapped through DL-ORAM while public data I/O is mapped through the PPM. The public data inserts and updates simulates an access to the DL-ORAM. In *ONLY_PUB* mode free blocks are located using the PFL.

of *ONLY_PUB* mode), DataLair Full writes random data instead of the stash for indistinguishability. On boot-up, the stash is read to memory and reencrypted.

Figure 8 illustrates the DataLair Full design.

Security. DataLair Full derives its security properties straightforwardly from DataLair Lite. First, note that the only difference between the schemes is that public data and hidden data coexist in the same physical address space. Public data is mapped randomly, *independent* of the locations where hidden data is already stored. This is ensured by the free block selection mechanism. The PPM and the PFL (added in this construction) are public data and do not need to be protected.

Similar to the Lite construction, hidden writes through DL-ORAM are either performed with public writes (inserts and updates) or *simulated* indistinguishably. This provides HWA indistinguishability. Further, as shown above, the *ONLY_PUB* mode of operation is indistinguishable from the *PUB_HID* mode for DataLair Full. This ensures PAT indistinguishability. As shown before, these are the necessary and sufficient conditions for PD.

6 Evaluation

Implementation. We implemented DataLair Full as a kernel module device mapper, a Linux based framework for mapping blocks in logical volumes to physical blocks. The default cipher used is AES-256 in counter mode with individual per-block random IVs. Underlying hardware blocks are 512 bytes each and 8 adjacent hardware blocks constitute a DataLair “physical block”. Logical and physical block sizes are 4KB.

Access	dm-crypt	DataLair	HIVE [7]
Public Read	225.56	84.1	0.88
Public Write	210.10	2.00	0.57
Hidden Read	n/a	6.00	5.36
Hidden Write	n/a	2.92	0.60

Table 1. Throughput Comparison (MB/s). Higher is better. DataLair performance for public data reads is practical when compared to dm-crypt and almost 100x faster than existing work [7]. For hidden data writes, DataLair is 5x faster.

DataLair was benchmarked with two logical volumes (one public and one hidden) using an ext4 filesystem in ordered mode (metadata journaling) on top. Each volume was allocated a logical size of 25% of the underlying device capacity. This ensures that the combined size of the logical volumes is 50% of the device, thus ensuring that 50% of the device is always free. Throughput was compared against Hive [7] as well dm-crypt, a commonly used linux device mapper for full disk encryption.

Platform. Benchmarks were conducted on Linux boxes with Intel Core i7-3520M processors running at 2.90GHz and 6GB+ of DDR3 DRAM. The storage device was a 1TB Samsung-850 Evo SSD. Logical volume sizes were set 64GB while DataLair was built on a 256GB physical partition. Benchmarking was performed using Bonnie++ [1] on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, kernel version 3.13.6. Benchmarking for Hive [7] was performed with the same parameters by compiling the open source project [2].

System caches were flushed in between tests. All tests were run 3 times and results collected with 95% confidence interval. DataLair stores all internal data structures persistently. The in-memory stash used was constrained to 50 4KB blocks (200KB of data).

Throughput. Table 1 shows throughput comparison for DataLair, HIVE and dm-crypt. Public reads feature a throughput of about 85MB/s, 100x faster than existing work [7] and only 2.5x slower than dm-crypt. The speedup results from the fact that public reads do not need to use the ORAM. Note that the PPM still needs to be accessed first for determining the physical location of the logical block. This additional synchronous access results in the overhead when compared to dm-crypt.

Public writes simulate a DL-ORAM access. The improved write complexity of DL-ORAM compared to HIVE-ORAM [7] results in a 4x speedup. Later we show how to optimize this further for more practical use. Similarly, hidden writes for DataLair are almost 5x faster than HIVE. Hidden reads perform comparably to HIVE

Access	dm-crypt	DataLair	HIVE [7]
Public Read	.007	.018	1
Hidden Read	n/a	.10	.19
Public Write	.7	25	332
Hidden Write	n/a	92	219

Table 2. Latency Comparison (in seconds). Lower is better. DataLair is 100x faster than HIVE [7] for public reads and almost 10x faster public writes.




Fig. 9. Variations in public write throughput vs. the public write to private write ratio. The x-axis represents the number of public writes that are performed in between two private writes/simulation. The throughput plateaus at around 12 MB/s, around 6x faster than the configuration where hidden writes are made with each public write. The benefits of performing hidden writes only with updates is visible even in this case.

since the overall read complexity is asymptotically the same for DL-ORAM and HIVE-ORAM [7].

Latency. Table 2 shows the latency comparison for DataLair, HIVE and dm-crypt. Expectedly, DataLair public reads are almost 100x faster than HIVE [7]. It also interesting to note that DataLair public writes are almost 15x faster than HIVE [7]. This is due to the reduced number of I/Os that needs to be performed per access due to the better write-complexity of DL-ORAM.

Writing hidden data with public updates. A straightforward optimization for DataLair is to use only public updates (in-place) for hidden writes/simulations, avoiding the expensive free block selection. In fact, since filesystem block access patterns typically follows a *zipfian distribution* [16] – only a small group of existing blocks are accessed/updated frequently – an update to a group of already existing public data blocks is more likely than inserting new data. Also, since filesystems do not indicate deletes to the device, once the public volume is completely occupied, all subsequent operations during the lifetime of the disk will be treated as updates by the device mapper.

Frequency of Hidden Writes. DataLair features a solution for PD-CPA (Section 3) where the number of hidden operations performed with each public opera-

tion, $\phi = 1$. For real world applications, it is reasonable to assume that a user will access hidden data less often than public data. In that case, ϕ can be configured according to an estimated workload to improve the public write throughput.

Figure 9 shows the variations in the public write throughput while increasing the public write to private write ratio. The throughput achieves a maximum of around 12MB/s when hidden writes/simulations are made every 10 public writes (inserts and updates). When hidden writes/simulations are performed only with updates (as described above), the write throughput achieves a maximum of around 30MB/s, around 40x faster than HIVE [7]. Note that since HIVE [7] uses a write-only ORAM for public writes, excluding hidden writes for a fraction of the public writes does not result in significant gains when compared to the overhead of the ORAM. Although, DataLair is still 7x slower than dm-crypt (Table 1), the additional PD guarantees over full disk encryption makes this acceptable in practice.

7 Conclusion

This work shows that it is not necessary to sacrifice performance to achieve plausible deniability (PD), even in the presence of a powerful multi-snapshot adversary. DataLair is a block device with practical performance and PD assurances, designed around a new efficient write-only ORAM construction. DataLair public data reads are two orders of magnitude faster than existing approaches while accesses to hidden data are 5 times faster. For more restricted settings, DataLair can achieve public data write performance almost 50x faster than existing work.

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A Proofs

Theorem 1. *A storage mechanism is PD-CPA secure iff. it guarantees indistinguishability between hidden write access patterns (HWA) and indistinguishability between public operations with and without hidden writes (PAT).*

Proof. HWA straightforwardly ensures that even if the same logical locations in V_{hid} are written by two access patterns in two rounds, their write traces are independent. Otherwise, an adversary could win one of the games by observing the same write traces for the same writes to V_{hid} in subsequent rounds.

Also, in absence of PAT, an adversary could win PD-CPA by providing \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 with the *same* public data operations but with and without writes to V_{hid} respectively. Thus, PAT is a necessary condition to ensure PD-CPA security.

We now show that HWA and PAT are also sufficient for PD-CPA. First, note that HWA ensures that writes to locations in hidden volume V_{hid} map to physical locations selected independently of their corresponding logical locations. Logical and physical locations are uncorrelated. An adversary cannot determine the logical locations corresponding to observed modified physical locations.

Second, observe that in the context of the PD-CPA game, PAT ensures that traces due to combined writes to V_{hid} and V_{pub} can be attributed to writes corresponding to V_{pub} only. And, as the writes to V_{pub} are the same in both the sequences, the adversary cannot distinguish between the write traces non-negligibly better than guessing.

Now, consider a PD solution, S which provides both HWA and PAT. Also, consider an adversary \mathcal{A} that wins PD-CPA against S selecting two sequences \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 . Since, \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 differ only in the writes to V_{hid} (writes to V_{pub} are the same), either of the following holds:

- \mathcal{O}_0 and \mathcal{O}_1 contain different writes to V_{hid} and they are distinguishable from the corresponding write traces in direct contradiction to the HWA property of S .
- \mathcal{O}_0 contains writes to V_{hid} and \mathcal{O}_1 does not contain writes to V_{hid} , and the corresponding write traces are distinguishable. This implies that traces due to combined writes to V_{hid} and V_{pub} in \mathcal{O}_0 are distinguishable from traces with only the *same* writes to V_{pub} in \mathcal{O}_1 , in direct contradiction to the PAT property of S .

Note that ensuring HWA without PAT and vice versa is not sufficient for PD-CPA since either of the above two cases will allow the adversary to win with non-negligible advantage. □

B DL-ORAM Protocols

input : logical block address id

```

1 root:= //determine B+ tree root address from
   fixed location on disk;
2 depth := logβ(N);
3 index := βdepth;
4 while not at leaf do
5   root := // child # ⌊indexid⌋;
6   // Search subtree rooted at root;
7   blk = // Read physical block corresponding
   to root;
8   depth := depth - 1;
9   index := index/β;
10 end
11 addr := // entry for B in root;
12 blk := // Read block from disk with address
   addr;
return: Decrypt(blk)

```

Algorithm 1: $read_oram(id)$

input : logical block address id , data d

```

1 root:= //determine B+ tree root address from fixed
   location on disk;
2 depth := logβ(N);
3 index := βdepth;
4 while not at leaf do
5   root := // child # ⌊indexid⌋;
6   // Search subtree rooted at root;
7   blk = // Read physical block corresponding to root;
8   depth := depth - 1;
9   index := index/β;
10 end
11 // Find free block for new write // ;
12 new_blk_id := // Find free block ;
13 disk.Write(new_blk_id, d) ;
14 Map.updateMap(id, new_blk_id) ;

```

Algorithm 2: $write_oram(\beta, d)$

```
input : logical block address for map node id, physical  
        block address where map node is written  
        new_blk_id  
1 root := //Determine from fixed location;  
2 if at root then  
3   | // Update new root address at fixed location //  
4 else  
5   | l := // READ leaf node for id;  
6   | id := // ID for leaf node;  
7   | // Update l with new mapping for id;  
8   | write_oram(id, l);  
Algorithm 3: Map.updateMap(id, new_blk_id)
```