DeVoS: Deniable Yet Verifiable Vote Updating
Authors: Johannes Müller (University of Luxembourg), Balázs Pejó (Budapest University of Technology and Economics), Ivan Pryvalov (University of Luxembourg & Brandenburg University of Technology)
Volume: 2024
Issue: 1
Pages: 357–378
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0021
Abstract: Internet voting systems are supposed to meet the same high standards as traditional paper-based systems when used in real political elections: freedom of choice, universal and equal suffrage, secrecy of the ballot, and independent verifiability of the election result. Although numerous Internet voting systems have been proposed to achieve these challenging goals simultaneously, few come close in reality. We propose a novel publicly verifiable and practically efficient Internet voting system, DeVoS, that advances the state of the art. The main feature of DeVoS is its ability to protect voters' freedom of choice in several dimensions. First, voters in DeVoS can intuitively update their votes in a way that is deniable to observers but verifiable by the voters; in this way voters can secretly overwrite potentially coerced votes. Second, in addition to (basic) vote privacy, DeVoS also guarantees strong participation privacy by end-to-end hiding which voters have submitted ballots and which have not. Finally, DeVoS is fully compatible with Perfectly Private Audit Trail, a state-of-the-art Internet voting protocol with practical everlasting privacy. In combination, DeVoS offers a new way to secure free Internet elections with strong and long-term privacy properties.
Keywords: electronic voting, everlasting privacy, verifiability, receipt-freeness, participation privacy
Copyright in PoPETs articles are held by their authors. This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license.
