Extending the Security of SPDZ with Fairness
Authors: Bart Veldhuizen (Independent researcher), Gabriele Spini (TNO), Thijs Veugen (TNO and Twente University), Lisa Kohl (CWI)
Volume: 2024
Issue: 2
Pages: 330–350
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0053
Abstract: SPDZ refers to a family of protocols for Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) that lie at the foundation of very popular software frameworks for MPC, such as SCALE-MAMBA and MP-SPDZ. SPDZ provides good efficiency while guaranteeing security even when all but one of the participants are corrupted. This seemingly optimal property comes at a price: the protocol only offers security with abort, meaning that even a single cheating participant can force the protocol to abort, leaving honest participants with no clue on what the correct output is, or who cheated. This is especially problematic since cheating participants are able to obtain the correct output of the computation, effectively `stealing' it. We propose a *hybrid secure* adaptation to SPDZ, which retains the existing security guarantees, but in case the number of cheating players is less than half of the total, we achieve *fairness*, meaning that either all players obtain the correct output of the computation, or no player does. The `less than half' threshold of corrupted players has been proven to be a tight bound to achieve fairness. Aside from the description of the protocol and its security proof, we also present a proof-of-concept implementation, and evaluate its practical performance, thereby demonstrating that our solution has negligible overhead compared to standard SPDZ in most application scenarios.
Keywords: Secure Multi-Party Computation, SPDZ, fairness, hybrid security
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