Re-visiting Authorized Private Set Intersection: A New Privacy-Preserving Variant and Two Protocols
Authors: Francesca Falzon (ETH Zürich), Evangelia Anna Markatou (TU Delft)
Volume: 2025
Issue: 1
Pages: 792–807
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2025-0041
Abstract: We revisit the problem of Authorized Private Set Intersection (APSI), which allows mutually untrusting parties to authorize their items using a trusted third-party judge before privately computing the intersection. We also initiate the study of Partial-APSI, a novel privacy-preserving generalization of APSI in which the client only reveals a subset of their items to a third-party semi-honest judge for authorization. Partial-APSI allows for partial verification of the set, preserving the privacy of the party whose items are being verified. Both APSI and Partial-APSI have a number of applications, including genome matching, ad conversion, and compliance with privacy policies such as the GDPR. We present two protocols based on bilinear pairings with linear communication. The first realizes the APSI functionality, is secure against a malicious client, and requires only one round of communication during the online phase. Our second protocol realizes the Partial-APSI functionality and is secure against a client that may maliciously inject elements into its input set, but who follows the protocol semi-honestly otherwise. We formally prove correctness and security of these protocols and provide an experimental evaluation to demonstrate their practicality. Our protocols can be efficiently run on commodity hardware. We also show that our protocols are massively parallelizable by running our experiments on a compute grid across 50 cores.
Keywords: Private Set Intersection, 2PC, Secure Multiparty Computation
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